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FAILING COMPANIES AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
Janet L. McDavid*
This is a period of uncertainty for the American economy generally, and for American business in particular. The nation has
been suffering under double-digit inflation for several years; 1 unemployment is high and expected to increase;2 overall corporate
profits have declined; 8 and several major corporations have sustained record losses. 4
The law reacts to such economic difficulties in different ways.
In the area of antitrust law, the courts have been willing to give
special consideration to financially-troubled companies. Failing
companies, under certain circumstances, have been allowed to
engage in conduct that, if done by a healthy corporation, would
constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. Several rationales for
this special treatment exist. The first is the belief that competition may be promoted, or at least not adversely affected, if ar* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A., 1971, Northwestern University; J.D.,
1974, Georgetown University.
' According to the United States Department of Labor, prices for finished goods increased 1. 7 % in July, 1980, for a compounded annual rate of 22.4 %. Wall St. J., Sept. 8,
1980, at 3, col l; BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 1, 1980, at 16. The consumer price index for 1980
rose 12.4%, only slightly better than the 13.3% increase for 1979. Wall St. J., Jan. 26,
1981, at 3, col 1.
• Between May and August, 1980, the unemployment rate ranged between 7.6 and
7.8%. Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
.
• According to a United States Department of Commerce report, corporate profits declined 18.2% in the second quarter of 1980. Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1980, at 3, col. 1. In
July, 1980, factories operated at 74.2% of capacity, the lowest rate in five years. Wall St.
J., Aug. 19, 1980, at 3, col 1.
• The American automobile manufacturers all sustained record losses in 1980: General
Motors, $762.5 million, Ford Motor Co., $1.54 billion, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1981, at 4, col.
2; American Motors, $197.5 million, Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1981, at 8, col. 2. Chrysler Corporation lost $1.7 billion, the largest annual loss in United States corporate history. Wall
St. J., March 2, 1981, at 3, col. 1. Chrysler exists today only because the federal government approved a $1.5 billion guaranteed loan. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Act of
1979, P.L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1979). For a general discussion of Chrysler's
financial condition, and the effect of its potential bankruptcy, see H.R. REP. No. 96-690,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in (1979) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2787, 278991. Since January 1, 1979, Chrysler has eliminated 15,000 jobs and closed half a dozen
plants. Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
During its fourth quarter, United States Steel Corp. lost $561.7 million, one of the
biggest quarterly net losses ever for an American corporation. Id. at 3, col. 3. U.S. Steel
has closed 15 unprofitable plants and eliminated 10,000 jobs. Id.
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guably unlawful conduct permits a marginal competitor to remain in the market. Similarly, the courts theorize that the
acquisition of a failing company may not result in the lessening
of competition that might result from a merger of two profitable
, companies. Finally, the courts also are aware of the social consequences of business failure.
This article will examine two areas in which the courts have
given financially-troubled companies special treatment under
the antitrust laws. Part I discusses the acquisition of a failing
company, which may constitute a judicially-created exemption
from section 7 of the Clayton Act. 11 Part II considers certain
cases involving failing companies whose conduct is challenged
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6
I.

MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND THE FAILING COMPANY
DOCTRINE

Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part that
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
. . . or the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly. 7
The courts have interpreted section 7 to apply to horizontal,8
vertical,9 and, to some extent, conglomerate mergers,1° as well as
• 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1976).
15 u.s.c. § 1 (1976).
7
15 u.s.c. § 18 (1976).
8
Section 7 applies to horizontal mergers, that is, mergers between competitors. See,
e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (merger of grocery chains
with combined market share of 7.5% unlawful where there was a trend toward concentration); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (merger of two
commercial banks with a combined market share of 30% illegal in a concentrated market); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (structure and history of
industry, barriers to entry, concentration, and market shares must be considered in evaluating merger of shoe manufacturer with retail chain of shoe stores having some manufacturing capability).
• Section 7 also applies to vertical mergers, that is, mergers between suppliers and
customers. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (automobile
manufacturer's acquisition of supplier of spark plugs and batteries); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (merger between shoe manufacturer and retail shoe
store chain); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (auto8
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to joint ventures. 11 In addition, challenges to mergers are possible under section 1 of the Sherman Act12 or section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 18 The "failing company doctrine" is
a defense to such actions.

A. Judicial Interpretation of the Failing Company Doctrine:
Elements of the Defense.
The "failing company doctrine" is a judicially created defense,
sanctioned by Congress,1' to actions challenging otherwise unmobile paint manufacturer held 23% of stock of General Motors).
•• Several varieties of conglomerate mergers exist, including product extension mergers, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (manufacturer of detergents acquired bleach manufacturers), and market extension mergers, United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd mem. sub nom. Bartlett v. United
States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971) (merger between copper company and oil company which
might have entered copper industry). The courts condemn conglomerate mergers because
they may prevent a potential entrant from entering a market, e.g., Procter & Gamble, or
because they create a danger of reciprocal buying, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
380 U.S. 592 (1965). Proposals have emerged to impose limitations on acquisitions between major corporations on the ground that mere size and concentration of assets may
be undesirable. See, e.g., (1980) 951 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-4; (1979]
925 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-21 (proposed legislation to prevent oil company acquisitions); (1979] 921 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-22 (FTC staff
proposals); (1979] 902 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-17 (FTC Commissioner
Pitofsky favors tougher merger standards for large firms); (1979] 895 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Justice Department proposal to prevent acquisitions by
major corporations). The FTC recently rejected a staff recommendation that it adopt a
trade regulation rule concerning the standards of proof applicable in potential competition merger cases before the FTC. (1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,419.
11
See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture by
two companies illegal where either might have entered the market separately).
,. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
•• Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides in pertinent part, "(u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1976). Mergers can be
unlawful under Section 5. See In re Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146 (1966), modified,
395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1967); In re Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962). Courts
have held that every violation of§ 7 is also a violation of§ 5. See, e.g., Stanley Works v.
FTC, 469 F.2d 498,499 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973). The Fourth
Circuit recently found, however, that a merger may not be enjoined solely under § 5.
FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 291-92 n.l (4th Cir. 1977).
" The Senate Report on the 1950 amendments to § 7 stated:
The argument has been made that the proposed bill, if passed, would have the
effect of preventing a company which is in a failing or bankrupt condition from
selling out.
The committee are [sic] in full accord with the proposition that any firm in
such a condition should be free to dispose of its stock or assets. The committee,
however, do [sic] not believe that the proposed bill will prevent sales of this
type.
The judicial interpretation on this point goes back many years and is abundantly clear. According to decisions of the Supreme Court, the Clayton Act does
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lawful mergers or acquisitions.1& The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine in International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 16 which involved a horizontal merger between two shoe manufacturers.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had found that the
merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, but the Supreme
Court reversed on two grounds. First, the Court found that the
parties to the merger competed in separate markets, and that
the merger would not substantially lessen competition. 17 The
second basis for reversal was that the acquired company faced
"financial ruin". 18 The Court postulated two rationales for the
creation of the doctrine. The first emphasized the social consequences of business failure, noting the adverse impact on stockholders, creditors, employees, and others. The second rationale
assumed that little lessening of competition would occur if a corporation that otherwise would fail was acquired even by a
competitor.
Under the traditional formulation of the failing company docnot apply in bankruptcy or receivership cases. Moreover, the Court has held,
with respect to this specific section, that a company does not have to be actually
in a state of bankruptcy to be exempt from its provisions; it is sufficient that it is
heading in that direction with the probability that bankruptcy will ensue.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1950) U. S. ConE CONG. SERV.
4293, 4299; accord, H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
ia The failing company doctrine is applicable to mergers challenged under either § 7 or
§ 5. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (§ 7); United
States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970) (§ 5). Some dispute has arisen,
however, concerning the extent to which the doctrine is applicable to mergers challenged
under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Compare American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 F.
91, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1917) (acquisition of failing company does not violate § 1 of Sherman
Act) with Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080, 1092-93 (D. Md.
1969) (doctrine inapplicable to mergers challenged under § 1).
18
280 U.S. 291 (1930). An earlier version of the failing company doctrine was the basis
for a 1917 circuit court decision permitting the acquisition of a failing company in an
action under § 1 of the Sherman Act. American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 F. 91
(7th Cir. 1917).
" 280 U.S. at 298-99.
'" The Court stated:
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with resources so depleted
and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability
of a business failure with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the communities where its plants were operated, we hold that the purchase of its capital
stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective purchaser), not with a
purpose to lessen competition, but to facilitate the accumulated business of the
purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and does
not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within the intent of
the Clayton Act.
Id. at 302. For a discussion of the financial condition of the acquired company in International Shoe, see Blum, The Failing Company Doctrine, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L.
REV. 75, 76-81 (1974).
.
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trine, the acquiring company must prove two elements: (1) the
probability of imminent business failure or the target company
and (2) the unavailability of other purchasers with less anticompetitive impact. 18 Because the doctrine is an exception to the
general rules governing acquisitions, the courts have construed
the requirements of the defense narrowly. The failing company
doctrine is apparently an affirmative defense, and the parties to
the acquisition bear the burden of proving that these conditions
have been satisfied. 10
1. "Imminent business failure" - The requirement of imminent business failure has been the subject of extensive judicial
interpretation. The courts have interpreted strictly the International Shoe requirement of "grave probability of business failure." Courts have not been convinced that business failure is imminent when a company continues to be profitable,u is solvent, 22
or has prospects of showing a profit. H Likewise, a showing that
management of a viable company intends to go out of business
or liquidate,14 or that a company has either declining profits or
large losses,u is badly managed,H lacks capital for moderniza" See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971) (acquisition by newspaper of printing company that was profitable, but which owners chose
to sell rather than modernize).
10
See text accompanying notes 156-62 infra. See also Citizen Publishing Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1969).
"' United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971).
11
FTC v. Food Town Stores, 539 F.2d 1339, 1345 (4th Cir. 1976) (company had substantial short-term liabilities, but was solvent and operated at a profit); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 999-1000 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (company with large
losses was solvent and could obtain credit).
•• In re Papercraft Corp., 78 F.T.C. 1352, 1406-08 (1971) (company had operating
losses and management problems, but had significant sales and assets).
" See, e.g., Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 1961) (owners
of profitable sand company, which was a going concern; wanted to liquidate); United
States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1258-60 (C.D. Cal. 1973), a{f'd per
curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (parts of acquired company were profitable; intention to go
out of business irrelevant) .
.. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 133, 137 (1969); F &
M Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 817 (2d Cir. 1979) (large
losses and declining sales, but company was rebuilding with support of creditors); United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 999-1000 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (declining market share and sales, but company had substantial assets and sound credit rating); cf. In
re Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1272-84 (1966) (company with declining sales, but
was able to meet its short-term debts and had operating profit; was not failing).
11
United States v. American Technical Industries, Inc., (1974] TRADE CAB. (CCH) ,r
74,873 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (negative cash balance and liabilities exceeded assets, but company operated at a profit in most years); cf. Crown-Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d
800, 831 (9th Cir. 1961) (death of key officer involved in attempt to rehabilitate
company).
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tion, 27 or has obsolete facilities is insufficient to prove this element of the defenS'e. 28 However, the fact that a company is in
bankruptcy or imminent danger of bankruptcy, or is unable to
pay its debts as they mature, appears to satisfy the requirement
of probable business failure. 29 Thus, the courts have required
that defendants show a strong likelihood of business failure.
The courts' emphasis on evidence of failure seems entirely appropriate. Many businesses experience periods of decline without ever facing any real prospect of bankruptcy. 30 Thus, the
courts have properly attempted to distinguish financially-troubled companies from failing companies, although in some cases
such a distinction may be difficult to draw. As long as any reasonable possibility exists that a company can be rehabilitated,
the courts should not permit an anticompetitive acquisition.
2. No other available purchasers- The requirement that
there be no other available purchasers has been the subject of
less judicial interpretation than the imminent business failure
requirement. Presumably the requirement is imposed to satisfy
the court that less anticompetitive alternatives to the otherwise
unlawful acquisition are unavailable. Thus, courts have required
that the failing company actively seek alternative purchasers. 81
As one court stated, the failing company must show that it "undertook a well conceived and thorough canvass of the industry
.., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971).
18
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Dean
Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1280-81 (1966), modified, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968).
" See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 606 (6th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Culbro Corp., (1980-81) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ,i 63,692 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 779-81 (D. Md. 1976);
United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 98-101 (D. Colo. 1975); National Tea Co.,
69 F.T.C. 226, 261, 366 (1966).
00
Although Ford Motor Company has sustained record losses recently, few would sug. gest that Ford is a failing company. See note 4 supra. Ford presumably has the resources
necessary to reverse its recent losses. Therefore, Ford's acquisition by a competitor or a
potential entrant into the automobile industry would damage competition. If, however,
Ford, like Chrysler, were to sustain such losses for a number of consecutive years, and
were burdened with obsolete facilities which it was unable to rehabilitate without substantial capital expenditures, the courts might regard Ford as a failing company. Faced
with the alternative of bankruptcy or merger,- a court might permit Ford to be acquired
in an otherwise unlawful acquisition.
•• See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 556 (1971);
Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 918 (1973); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 781-82 (D.
Md. 1976); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 101-02 (D. Colo. 1975); In re
Retail Credit Co., (1976-79 Transfer. Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,446 (FTC
1978). But see United States v. Culbro Corp., (1980-81) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ,i 63,692
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (financial difficulties well-known, but no other offer was made).
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such as to ferret out viable alternative partners for a merger." 81
One failing company, for example, was held not to have made an
adequate effort where it had failed to utilize the services of an
investment banker to attempt to locate other potential
purchasers. 33
Indeed, it would be desirable if the courts required the failing
company to prove that no company outside of the industry
would consider the acquisition, although such proof would be
difficult. From the standpoint of promoting or preserving competition, a purchaser from outside the industry who would be
unlikely to enter the industry absent the acquisition would be
most desirable. The next best alternative would be a potential
entrant, while an acquisition by another competitor would be
least desirable. By forcing the failing company to make a diligent search for an alternative purchaser, this requirement permits the courts to attempt to minimize the anticompetitive ef- .
feet of an acquisition.
3. Dim prospects of reorganization- Courts also have discussed requirements other than the two set forth in International Shoe. In 1969, in Citizens Publishing Co. v. United
States, 34 the Supreme Court implied that inability to reorganize
a failing company under the bankruptcy laws might be a third
requirement of the failing company doctrine. Later Supreme
Court decisions, however, omit any reference to the reorganization possibility as a third requirement, 311 and the few lower
courts that have considered the issue are divided. 38
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
.. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen, 348 F. Supp. 606, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976).
"' 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969). Citizen Publishing involved an unlawful joint operating
agreement between two newspapers. Following the Supreme Court's decision, Congress
passed the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1976), which was
designed to overrule Citizen Publishing. The Act created an antitrust exemption for
other ·existing joint operating agreements. It also permits future joint operating agreements if one of the newspapers is "in probable danger of business failure" and the Attorney General determines that such an arrangement would effectuate the policy and purpose of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1802(5), 1803(b) (1976).
16
See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974); United
States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971) .
.. Compare United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 606 n.30 (6th Cir. 1970)
and United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1259 (C.D. Cal. 1973),
aff'd per curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (dictum) with United States v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 778 (D. Md. 1976) (dictum) and United States v. M.P.M.,
Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 96 (D. Colo. 1975). In one recent case, United States v. Culbro
Corp., [1980-81) TRADE CAS. (CCH) 'II 63,692 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), unsuccessful attempts had
been made to reorganize the failing company under Chapter XI, and unless the acquisition took place it would be liquidated.
11
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Until the Supreme Court hands down a definitive decision, the
issue will remain unresolved. The possibility of reorganization
should be a factor only in those cases where a healthy competitor is likely to emerge. Arguably, if a company can be reorganized successfully, it may never have been actually failing. Reorganization also might be viewed as an alternative to the "no
other purchaser" requirement. 87 Clearly, successful reorganization is preferable to an anticompetitive acquisition because reorganization both preserves the competitor and prevents an increase in concentration. However, to predict whether a company
can be reorganized successfully is difficult. Refusing to permit
the acquisition of a failing company because there is some possibility that it could be reorganized seems extreme and unwise. An
unsuccessful reorganization serves neither competition nor society. Such a policy completely ignores the social effects of business failure which the courts should consider, even though such
effects are not of primary importance.
4. The failing division or subsidiary- The extent to which
the failing company doctrine applies to a failing division or subsidiary of an otherwise profitable, viable corporation, is quite
controversial. The question has received little attention in judicial decisions, and what little case law exists is divided. 88

B.

Administrative Interpretation of the Failing Company
Defense

In addition to being asserted as a defense to actions under
section 7, merging companies often raise the failing company
doctrine in pre-enforcement review proceedings before the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the FTC. 89 These ad., In United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 96 (D. Colo. 1975), the court
concluded that reorganization waa an alternative to the "no other purchaser" requirement of the doctrine.
aa Compare United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573, 584 n.1 (W.D.
Okla. 1967) (dictum suggesting the doctrine applies to failing subsidiaries) with United
States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (failing division not
within doctrine) and United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1260
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (doctrine inapplicable to profitable company with failing division). In United States v. Lever Brothers Co., 216 F. Supp.
887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the court permitted the sale of a failing brand of detergent to a
competitor.
aa The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (Supp.
III 1979), requires premerger notification filings with both agencies at least 30 days prior
to the consummation of certain acquisitions. In addition, the FTC provides advisory
opinions on certain transactions, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 et seq. (1980), and the Justice Department ofl'ers a "business review procedure," 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1980). The Justice Depart-
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ministrative agency interpretations of the failing company defense can often differ significantly from those of the courts.
1. "Imminent business failure"- As described in recent testimony before a congressional committee,' 0 the two federal antitrust enforcement agencies appear to approach the issue of imminent business failure in a similar manner. Both agencies
conduct a detailed investigation of the financial condition of the
parties.' 1 For example, the Antitrust Division obtains information from creditors and other financial institutions, trade associations, and other firms in the industry. 411 The FTC analysis
typically includes examination of trends in financial statements,
profitability, liquidity, a comparison with other firms in the industry, and the company's efficiency.' 8 The two agencies appear
to differ, however, in the extent to which they are willing to accept the defense, although there is no clear explanation or justification for those differences."
2. No other available purchaser-~ike the courts, the Justice Department and the FTC consider whether the acquiring
company is the only available purchaser. The Department looks
for "a bona fide attempt to find a less anticompetitive purchaser,
such as the use of an investment banker or extensive search.""
It prefers that this search be conducted prior to negotiating an
otherwise unlawful merger.'8 The FTC views a lower offer from a
ment's Merger Guidelines provide that a merger ordinarily will not be challenged "if . . .
the firm faces the clear probability of business failure ...." [1980) 1 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 11 4510.
•• Hearings on the Failing Company Defense Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Failing Company Hearings]. Assistant Attorney General John
Shenefield testified on behalf of the Department of Justice, and Daniel C. Schwartz,
Deputy Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition, testified on behalf of the FTC .
., Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 34 (testimony of John Shenefield); id.
at 48-49 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz) .
.. Id. at 34 (testimony of John Shenefield).
41
Id. at 48-49 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz).
•• According to Shenefield, in the period 1975-78, 22 companies raised the defense
before the Justice Department, which accepted it in 17 cases. Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 18 (testimony of John Shenefield). In contrast, an average of six
companies per year raise the defense before the FTC. Id. at 44 (testimony of Daniel C.
Schwartz). Most, however, are found not to be failing. Id. at 49.
•• Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 31 (testimony of John Shenefield).
For example, in one instance the Department required the failing company to consider
"any good faith offer from any company capable of operating ... [the failing company]
as a viable competitive entity regardless of how that offer compared to the present [outstanding] offer." Dept. of Justice Business Review Letter to Motorola, Inc., reprinted in
5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,209 (1974). The acquisition was approved after an investment banker contacted thirty-eight alternative purchasers who expressed no interest in
the acquisition and two more anticompetitive offers had been received. Id. at 11 50,212.
•• Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 32 (testimony of John Shenefield).
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less anticompetitive purchaser as preferable to a higher offer
from a competitor, who probably is willing to pay a premium to
increase its market share. 47 The FTC also regards community
and employee groups as alternatives to acquisition by a
competitor. 48
3. Dim prospects of reorganization- The Justice Department and the FTC have taken somewhat different positions on
the question whether it must be proved that the failing company
could not be reorganized. The Antitrust Division recognizes the
uncertainties present in attempted reorganizations, stating that
it has found the availability of bankruptcy as an alternative to a
merger as creating "especially close judgment calls."49 The Antitrust Division does "not view the possibility of a technically successful reorganization as an inflexible barrier to invocation of the
defense, but a consideration to be taken into account in determining its appropriateness. " 110
In contrast, the FTC regards the possibility of reorganization
as an essential third part of the failing company doctrine. 111 The
fact is, however, that both alternatives, acquisition and bankruptcy, might be anticompetitive. The courts, the FTC, and the
Antitrust Division must decide which is preferable. The FTC's
position seems to ignore the practical problems of reorganization
as well as the societal impact of business failure if reorganization
is unsuccessful.
4. The failing division or subsidiary- Although there are
few judicial opinions dealing with the failing subsidiary or division, the FTC and the Justice Department have taken somewhat
different approaches to this question, as demonstrated by their
decisions in three recent controversial acquisitions. The Justice
Department Merger Guidelines provide that the failing company
doctrine should apply to a failing division or subsidiary "only in
the clearest of circumstances. "H The Department acknowledges
that it is difficult to determine whether or not a division actually
" Id. at 47 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz).
•• Id. at 37. A recent attempt by a community group to purchase a plant that United
States Steel Corporation intended to close resulted in litigation when the company refused to negotiate with the group. Local 1330, United States Steel Workers v. United
States Steel Corp., [1980-2) TRADE CAB. (CCH) 11 63,486 (6th Cir. 1980).
•• Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 32 (testimony of John Shenefield).
00
Id.
01
See, e.g., Retail Credit Co. [1976-79 Transfer Binder) 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11
21,446 (F.T.C. 1978); United States Steel Corp., 81 F.T.C. 629, 653 (1972); Papercraft
Corp., 78 F.T.C. 1352, 1406-08 (1971); Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 47
(testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz).
•• [1977] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 4510.
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is failing. In making that evaluation, it claims to consider the
financial condition of the parent corporation as wen,u although
in practice it appears that it decides only whether the parent
actually intends to close the division or subsidiary.M Thus, the
Antitrust Division decided not to challenge the sale of General
Motors' Frigidaire Division to White Consolidated Industries. 511
GM had determined that Frigidaire was not producing sufficient
revenues and decided to convert the Frigidaire plant to truck
production. 68 Faced with GM's decision, the Antitrust Division
required a search for alternative purchasers, and ultimately permitted the acquisition:17
The FTC, on the qther hand, has been reluctant to permit
conglomerates to dispose of subsidiaries that are not producing a
satisfactory profit. According to the FTC, consolidated financial
statements make it difficult to determine whether a division is
failing or whether losses and liabilities are being allocated to the
division to create the appearance of failure. 118 Thus, the FTC refused to approve either the sale of the Federal Glass Division of
Federal Paperboard Company to Lancaster Colony Corporation119 or the sale of American Safety Razor, a Philip Morris subsidiary, to BIC, a French razor manufacturer. 60 The FTC beaa Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 18 (testimony of John Shenefield).
"' Id. at 19-20, 33.
06
Id. at 18; (1979] 910 ANTrrRuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-27.
"' Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 18-20 (testimony of John Shenefield).
•• Id. Senator Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) was critical of the Department's decision because
he viewed the acquisition as anticompetitive and felt that no adequate search for alternative purchasers had been made. Id. at 18-24. The Department also authorized a controversial merger between Ling-Temco-Vought and Lykes, both of which had subsidiaries involved in steel manufacturing. (1978] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,381.
08
Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 50-51 (testimony of Daniel C.
Schwartz).
•• The FTC obtained an injunction against the acquisition. FTC v. Lancaster Colony
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In 1978, Federal Paper Board threatened to
close Federal Glass, but because the FTC concluded that the division was profitable and
that an inadequate search had been made for alternative purchasers, it refused to permit
the sale. Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 50 (testimony of Daniel C.
Schwartz). The FTC withdrew its complaint only after the plant had closed and alternative purchasers had rejected the acquisition. Id.; Lancaster Colony Corp., Inc., (1979] 3
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 21,538 (F.T.C. 1979). During the recent Congressional hearings, Senator Metzenbaum was critical of the FTC's decision, but the FTC defended it
on the ground that at the time the FTC first disapproved the sale Federal Glass was not
a failing division. Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 37-41 (testimony of
Daniel C. Schwartz).
00
BIC and American Safety Razor (ASR) were the second and third largest manufacturers, respectively, in a highly concentrated industry. The FTC felt that ASR was not
failing and that Philip Morris had not sought alternative purchasers. Failing Company
Hearings, supra note 40, at 49 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz). Philip Morris
threatened to close ASR and laid off 250 workers, but eventually ASR was purchased by
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lieves that a conglomerate with a failing subsidiary has three
alternatives: liquidation, rehabilitation, or acceptance of a lower
overall profit level. 81 The FTC fears that extension of the failing
company doctrine to failing divisions will mean that "a conglomerate . . . can simply write off a line of business, a plant, a work
force, or a whole community, and can turn its attention elsewhere, leaving others to pick up the pieces."82
The views of the Justice Department and the FTC represent
two extremes, but neither position is completely acceptable. The
Justice Department recognizes that a genuinely failing division
poses a real problem to its parent corporation, which may regard
the alternatives of a large investment for rehabilitation or continuing losses as unacceptable. The Justice Department's practical approach does mean, however, that although a division is not
failing, if the parent insists on liquidation, the Department will
acquiesce in an acquisition. The Department requires a failing
company to prove that it actually is failing, but does not seem to
require the same showing in the case of a subsidiary. It appears
that the Department's position concerning the application of the
failing company doctrine to subsidiaries could be improved by a
more rigorous examination of the actual financial condition of
the subsidiary and the prospects of rehabilitation, as well as insistence on compliance with the alternative purchaser requirement. In short, the Justice Department should apply the failing
company doctrine to a failing division as strictly as it applies the
doctrine to a failing corporation.
On the other hand, the FTC's apparent insistence that the
failing company doctrine is inapplicable to a failing division inevitably will lead to harsh results, as in the case of Federal
Glass. A realistic evaluation of the difficult situation faced by a
parent corporation with a genuinely failing subsidiary should
temper the FTC's position.88
ASR's management. Id. at 49-50.
•• Id. at 51.
•• Id. at 50-51. In Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26 (1956), the FTC concluded that the
failing company doctrine did not permit a publisher to sell an unprofitable publication to
a competitor when its other publications were profitable.
•• Professors Areeda and Turner recognize the difficulty of applying the failing company doctrine to a failing subsidiary or division. IV P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTrrRUBT
LAW '11 926e at 112 (1980). As they note, a parent can manipulate the capital structure of
a wholly-owned subsidiary to create the appearance of failure. Id. Nonetheless, they conclude that the defense should not necessarily be inapplicable to a failing subsidiary. "It
would be unfair to force parent companies to absorb losses that independent companies
can avoid, or to take risks which independent lenders would deem improvident. At the
least, the parent should be permitted to make a showing that would establish a 'failing
division.' " Id.
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A Complete Defense or a Balancing Test?

The courts generally regard the failing company doctrine as a
complete defense to an action under section 7. 64 Because the
doctrine is interpreted narrowly and applied strictly, few companies are able to convince the courts that all elements of the defense have been satisfied. Assuming that the burden of proof can
be met, however, the issue remains whether the defense should
be absolute or whether the courts should engage in a balancing
of various interests.
One suggested absolute approach is that a "flexible per se" approach be used which adjusts the burden of proving ''no alternative purchasers" with the probable anticompetitive effect of the
acquisition. 611 Supporters of this approach cite the difficulty of
balancing various interests, and suggest that under a balancing
test, the doctrine would be almost impossible to prove. This
analysis, however, ignores the fact that the courts routinely balance various interests in antitrust cases. For example, in evaluating vertical trade restraints the courts must weigh the reduction of intrabrand competition against the enhancement of
interbrand competition resulting from the restraint. 66 While
such balancing is difficult, it can be achieved through the use of
expert testimony and sophisticated economic analysis.
Federal enforcement agencies, on the other hand, do not appear to treat the failing company doctrine as a complete defense.
The Justice Department acknowledges that it engages in a balancing analysis. For example, if anticompetitive impact is minimal, concern about the impact of business failure on the community may prevail. 67 The FTC takes a slightly different view.
After it has been established that conditions of the defense have
been fulfilled, the FTC analyzes the potential anticompetitive
effect of the acquisition in determining whether the acquisition
is lawful. 68 Thus, in United States Steel Corp., although the
traditional elements of the failing company defense were satis.. See generally Laurenza, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Failing Company:
An Updated Perspective, 65 VA. L. REV. 947 (1979).
•• Id. at 965.
"" See notes 140-44 and accompanying text infra.
•• Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 32 (testimony of John Shenefield).
88
See, e.g., Retail Credit Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 21,446 (F.T.C. 1978); Papercraft Corp., 78 F.T.C. 1352 (1971); United States Steel Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1280-88
(1968), remanded on other grounds, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970), on remand, 81 F.T.C.
629 (1972); Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1283 (1966), modified, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir.
1967).
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fied, the FTC nonetheless compelled United States Steel to
divest itself of the acquired company because of a trend toward
concentration and high barriers to entry in the industry.69 The
FTC concluded that the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition were not outweighed by the harms resulting from business
failure. 70
In the absence of congressional action, the doctrine should remain as an absolute defense which few companies can satisfy
since the defense applies only to otherwise anticompetitive acquisitions. It has long been true that the failing company defense is seldom asserted successfully, but Congress is aware of
the problem. One of the questions addressed during a recent
congressional hearing on the defense was whether the defense is
too difficult to establish. 71 If Congress believes that a less rigid
test should be used, it certainly is capable of changing the rules.

D.

Observations and Conclusions

The Supreme Court has described the failing company doctrine as a "lesser of two evils" approach. 71 The Court has apparently considered the possible threat to competition resulting
from an acquisition more acceptable than the adverse impact on
competition and other losses if the company goes out of business. The Court has thus preserved the dual rationale for the
doctrine articulated in International Shoe. These rationales,
however, may be simpler on their face than they are in fact.
Even under the failing company doctrine, in the absence of new
legislation the principal concern of the courts and enforcement
agencies should remain the acquisition's effect on competition,
rather than social impact of business failure. The acquisition of
a failing company by a large competitor may lead to an expansion of single-firm market power and entrenchment. In such circumstances, even the loss of a competitor through business failure, with the corresponding increase in concentration, may be
preferable from the standpoint of preserving competition.. For
example, the acquisition of even a failing company by a strong
competitor may further strengthen that competitor's position.
•• 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1303-4 (1968).
1
• Id. at 1304.

Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 2.
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974). Although the
Court did not rely on the failing company doctrine in General Dynamics, it did discuss
the doctrine at some length.
71

71
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In the absence of serious anticompetitive effect, however, the
social policy implications of business failure seem an appropriate
consideration. There have been suggestions that the courts
should consider social impact regardless of anticompetitive effect. Congressional debates, for example, emphasize the need to
protect the interests of stockholders, employees, and the community in which a failing firm is located. 73 Business failure adversely affects many people, including employees, stockholders,
creditors, and the local governments that lose tax revenues. Employees and local communities are especially unprotected in the
event of business failure. As a result, in several cases, employees,
unions, or local governments have attempted to acquire closed
plants and failing companies. 74
In general, both the courts and the federal enforcement agencies appear to approach the problem of the acquisition of a failing company from the proper perspective. They should continue
to emphasize the traditional elements of probable failure and no
alternative purchasers. Unless a company actually is failing, an
otherwise unlawful acquisition should not be permitted. To decide when a firm is "failing" is somewhat difficult, but discovery
in litigated actions or pre-enforcement requests for information
should develop sufficient financial data. 711 The premerger notification process required by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197678 presumably facilitates this evaluation
of potentially unlawful mergers by the FTC and the Antitrust
Division.
Similarly, the courts, the FTC, and the Justice Department
should continue to insist that failing companies attempt to lo,. See, e.g., Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings an H.R. 2734 Before a
Subcamm. of the Senate Camm. an the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 79-81 (1949
& 1950); Amending Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act: Hearings an H.R. 515 Before
Subcomm. No. 2 of the Hause Comm. an the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Seas. 9-12 (1947);
96 CONG. REc. 16445 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Thye); 96 CONG. REc. 16435 (1950) (remarks of Sen. O'Conor); 95 CONG. REc. 11490 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Michener); 95
CoNG. REc. 11487-88 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Goodwin).
•• Local 1330, United States Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., (1980-2)
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 11 63,486 (6th Cir. 1980), involved United States Steel's refusal to
negotiate to sell a closed plant to such a group. The district court dismissed a complaint
filed by the disappointed buyers alleging a violation of the Sherman Act and breach of
contract on the grounds that no contract existed and that the Sherman Act did not apply. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for additional proceedings to supplement
the record, although it agreed that the complaint raised novel issues.
•• The Department of Justice can compel the production of documents at the investigative stage before a complaint has been issued. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1976).
•• See note 39 supra. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act authorizes both the FTC and the
Department of Justice to require the parties to a merger to produce various types of
information concerning the parties and the transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976).
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cate the least anticompetitive purchaser. Only when it has been
established that no alternative purchaser can be located should
a competitor be permitted to acquire a failing company. If a substantial possibility exists that a failing company can be reorganized successfully, the courts or federal agencies should explore
that alternative. Again, it may be difficult to determine whether
reorganization is possible or whether there are no alternative
purchasers. The burden of proving the lack of alternative purchasers should continue to rest on the failing company. It can
meet that burden by showing that it made genuine efforts to locate other purchasers. The FTC takes the correct position when
it contends that a failing company cannot reject an offer from an
alternative purchaser simply because the offer is lower than the
offer made by a competitor. To permit such a rejection would
relegate protection of competition to secondary importance behind protecting stockholders and others.
The failing subsidiary or division problem poses difficult issues. As noted above, neither the FTC nor the Antitrust Division has found an adequate solution to the problem. They
should approach the failing subsidiary or division as they approach the failing company: the parent corporation should be required to prove both failure and an inability to locate alternative
purchasers. Because of the difficulty of determining whether a
subsidiary is failing or merely producing an inadequate profit,
the emphasis should be on locating the least anticompetitive
purchaser.

E.

The "General Dynamics" Defense

In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 77 the Supreme
Court concluded that the acquisition of a coal company did not
violate section 7, despite the fact that the acquisition produced a
company with a large market share in a concentrated industry.
One of the factors the Court emphasized was that in this case
large market share did not accurately reflect the acquired company's competitive weakness because its coal reserves were either depleted or committed under long-term contracts. 78 The acquired company's future competitive weakness undermined the
government's prima facie statistical case. The Court made it
clear that mere competitive weakness was not sufficient to prove
the failing company defense because the acquired company was
" 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
•• Id. at 503-04.
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both profitable and efficient. Rather, the Court determined that
the acquisition would not substantially lessen competition. 79 The
Court believed that present combined market shares did not accurately reflect future competitive weakness. 80
In General Dynamics, the Court did not intend to loosen the
requirements of the failing company doctrine. Indeed, the dicta
in General Dynamics concerning the failing company doctrine
emphasizes the traditional elements of the doctrine. The true
significance of General Dynamics is that the Court made a realistic evaluation of the competitive effect of the acquisition of a
company that was not a strong competitor but was not failing.
Lower courts have not only accepted, but have even expanded
the General Dynamics defense. Some of these decisions, however, reveal a serious misunderstanding of General Dynamics.
Some decisions have created a quasi-failing company defense for
companies that are merely faltering. In United States v. International Harvester Co., 81 for example, the court held that the
acquisition did not violate section 7 because the acquired company did not have sufficient financial resources to compete effectively. 82 A similar conclusion was reached in United States v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 88 where technological difficulties and ·
limited product variety had resulted in a decline in sales and an
impaired ability to compete on the part of the acquired
company.
Not all decisions, however, have followed the trend begun in
International Harvester. Some lower courts have applied General Dynamics only in evaluating competitive strengths and
weaknesses. Thus, in FTC v. National Tea Co.," the Eighth Circuit applied General Dynamics in concluding that because the
acquired company was such an ineffective competitor and so
likely to depart from the market that its present market share
inaccurately reflected its future competitive position, the merger
should not be enjoined. Similarly, in United States v. Amax, 811
•• Id. at 507-08.
"° Id. at 510-11.
•• 564 F.2d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 1977).
•• In F & M Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979),
the Second Circuit avoided deciding whether to follow United States v. International
Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977), by concluding that the acquired company
was an effective competitor. International Harvester was cited favorably in a recent district court decision, Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp., No. 65-C-1755 (N.D. ill., filed
July 22, 1980), where the court found that management problems undermined a company's competitive position. Slip op. at 63-66.
ea 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
" 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979).
.. 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975).
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the defendant argued that its costs were so high that it might be
forced to leave the market and that, like General Dynamics, it
lacked access to essential resources. Although the court in Amax
recognized the validity of the General Dynamics analysis, it concluded that the test was not met, particularly because, even
under defendant's assumed facts, the merger would result in an
unlawfully large market share.
The judicial expansion of General Dynamics in cases such as
International Harvester has been roundly criticized. The Antitrust Division, for example, believes that International Harvester is "a misapprehension of appropriate antitrust law."88
Then-Assistant Attorney General Shenefield testified before a
Senate Subcommittee that the Division will not be receptive to
claims of "financial weakness."87 In a recent decision,88 the FTC
expressly refused to follow International Harvester. 89 The FTC
correctly contends that the Supreme Court's decision in General
Dynamics did not create a new defense, but merely emphasized
that consideration should be given to the probable competitive
effect of the acquisition.90 This appears to be a correct interpretation of General Dynamics. Although some companies are attempting to use International Harvester to expand General Dy.. Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 25 (testimony of John Shenefield).
•• Id. at 34.
.. In re Pillsbury Co., (1976-79 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 'II 21,710
(F.T.C. 1979).
" Commissioner Pitofsky wrote:
Inclusion of financial weakness as a separate factor or defense-other than in a
failing company situation, of course-raises serious antitrust policy problems.
First, there may be a sort of double counting in that financial weaknesses may
already be reflected in a market share of the troubled company that is lower
than it would have been but for the financial problems. Second, the issue of
financial weakness is extremely difficult to handle in court, and susceptible to
invented claims and vague expert testimony generating factual issues that the
courts are not well equipped to measure. Third, if all sorts of company "weaknesses" or structural market changes operating to the disadvantage of particular
companies, can overcome a prima facie case of illegality, then the whole valuable
trend in merger enforcement toward streamlining cases by concentrating on
properly measured market shares and concentration ratios will be undermined.
This is not to say that in a close case, financial weakness cannot be taken into
account along with many other factors in predicting the market consequences of
a merger, but rather that there ought not be a broad "General Dynamics" defense that may be relied upon to overcome clear instances of illegality based on
market shares and concentration ratios.
Id. at '1121,709. Accord, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., (1976-79 Transfer Binder] 3
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 'II 21,578 (F.T.C. 1979); Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 246,
289-90 (1977), a/f'd mem., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 'II 21,566 (4th Cir. 1979).
"' Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 52 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz).
According to Schwartz, between five and eight firms a year unsuccessfully ask the FTC
to accept a General Dynamics defense. Id. ·
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namics and the failing company doctrine, the FTC intends to
resist these efforts. 91 The FTC is particularly concerned that
under General Dynamics the acquired company need not search
for other, less anticompetitive purchasers. 92 Although the FTC
generally seems to understand General Dynamics, its concern
about alternative purchasers seems inapposite because the focus
of General Dynamics is that competitive weakness may result in
an acquisition that does not substantially lessen competition.
The alternative purchaser issue is relevant to the failing company doctrine, not to the analysis required by General Dynamics. Finally, Professors Areeda and Turner have voiced similar
concerns. They believe that General Dynamics simply involved
"determining the proper measure of past market shares."98 They
note that in International Harvester it was not evident that
financial difficulties would lead necessarily to a decline in market power. 94
In general, the criticisms of attempts to· expand the General
Dynamics defense are well-founded. The Supreme Court did not
intend to create a new defense or to modify the failing company
doctrine. It merely held that the courts must realistically evaluate competitive strength. Thus, the decisions in Amax, National
Tea, and Pillsbury appear to have applied the proper standard.
In International Harvester, on the other hand, the acquired
company lacked only financial resources, which it presumably
could have obtained through other less anticompetitive means. A
simple infusion of capital would have rehabilitated the company.
Moreover, unlike General Dynamics, the court in International
Harvester made no attempt to evaluate future competitive effectiveness. There may be instances, such as in National Tea,
where financial and other difficulties seriously undermine competitive ability. In such cases the requirements of the failing
company doctrine may not be satisfied. Nonetheless, the acquisition may not be anticompetitive because without the merger the
acquired company lacked the means to compete effectively although it could have survived.
Because both the FTC and the Antitrust Division are hostile
to attempts to expand General Dynamics, that decision will
have little practical effect at the pre-enforcement stage. Indeed,
both agencies presumably will challenge acquisitions in which
•• Id. at 53.
H Id .
.. IV P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTrrauST LAw 11 934a at 134 (1980).
"' Id. 11 935b at 140-41. Accord, Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General Dynamics, 92 HARV. L. REv. 491, 509-11 (1978).
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the defense is asserted. Thus, in pre-enforcement proceedings
merging companies probably will have to meet the more stringent requirements of the traditional failing company doctrine.
The courts, however, have shown greater willingness to consider
a General Dynamics defense, although some have misapplied it.
II.

THE FAILING COMPANY DOCTRINE UNDER SECTION

1

The failing company exemption from section 7 is well established, having emerged over 50 years ago. Many judicial decisions, as well as legal scholars, have analyzed the doctrine. However, the financial condition of a competitor may be relevant to
alleged violations of other provisions of the antitrust laws as
well, such as section 1 of the Sherman Act.96 Unlike the failing
company exemption from section 7, this is a new and relatively
uncharted area. Few decisions have discussed the effect of
financial failure on an alleged section 1 violation. Nonetheless,
there is reason to believe that financial difficulties are an appropriate matter for courts to consider in analyzing section 1 cases
as well.
A.

The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Test

Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "every contract
. . in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal . . . ." 96 The courts soon recognized, however, that a literal
approach to antitrust issues was inappropriate. Under such an
approach section 1 would invalidate all contracts because, as
Justice Brandeis noted, "[e]very agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of
their very essence."97 As a result, in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 98 the Supreme Court concluded that section 1 should be
interpreted to prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints. 99
•• 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1976) .
.. Id.
07
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Supreme
Court arguably first applied the rule of reason in United States v. Trans Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
•• 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
" Id. at 58. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,
which involved a challenge to a commodity exchange rule designed to create an orderly
market, contains the classic formulation of the rule of reason. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
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In contrast, certain restraints, such as price fixing and other
horizontal restraints, are regarded as so inherently damaging to
competition that they have been classified as per se unreasonable.100 The courts presume that the only purpose that could underlie such restraints is the elimination of competition. 101 The
use of the per se standard simplifies the trial court's task. Although the rule of reason requires a detailed inquiry into the
history, purpose, and effect of the restraint, the per se standard
completely forecloses such analysis. 102 A per se test, however, is
somewhat rigid, making it difficult for lower courts to uphold a
practice that arguably falls within one of the per se categories,
but nonetheless seems reasonable on its face. 103
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectional regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Id. at 238. Thus, the rule of reason requires an analysis of the industry, the nature of the
defendant's business, the history of the restraint, the reasons why that restraint was
imposed, and the effect of the restraint. National Soc. of Prof. Engrs. v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
100
See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980) (per curiam)
(price fixing); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal
market division); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (resale price maintenance);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts); Northern
Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (horizontal market division); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing). The Court first found that
certain violations are so unreasonable that they cannot be justified in United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). The Court first expressly applied the per se
test in Socony-Vacuum, supra.
101
As the Court stated in Northern Pacific, certain agreements "because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use." 356 U.S. at 5 (1958). In United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927), the Court first used a per se
analysis, without using the term "per se."
10
• Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958).
10
• A good example is the Supreme Court's recent decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The Court of Appeals, feeling
constrained by the sweeping language of decisions holding that any agreement tending to
raise, lower, stabilize, or otherwise affect price constitutes unlawful price fixing, held that
blanket licensing of music was a per se violation of section 1. 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The Second Circuit recognized the practical difficulties in
licensing music in any other way, but nonetheless found that the practice was unlawful.
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the blanket license was not a naked restraint with no purpose except eliminating competition because individual licenses were
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B. Horizontal Restraints: The Effect of Financial Difficulties
In only one case, Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 104
has a court considered economic difficulties in a case involving a
horizontal restraint. The Supreme Court held that the conduct
at issue did not violate section 1 because of the economic difficulties faced by defendants. The focus of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Appalachian Coals was not the financial condition of
a single competitor but, rather, the condition of an entire industry. Nonetheless, Appalachian Coals represents a major foray by
the Supreme Court into consideration of a section 1 defendant's
economic well-being and, therefore, deserves further discussion.
The defendants were 137 producers of coal in Appalachia who
had formed a joint exclusive agency to sell their coal. The agent
established standard product classifications and sold coal at
prices fixed by the agent's officers. 1011 The Government challenged the arrangement because of its tendency to stabilize the
price of defendants' coal. Defendants claimed that the joint sales
agency was necessary to achieve marketing economies and to
eliminate destructive trade practices. They particularly emphasized the depressed economic condition of the coal industry; in
Appalachia, many coal companies were forced into bankruptcy
or receivership, while others simply closed mines.
Ignoring the obvious price fixing implications of the joint sales
agency, Chief Justice Hughes' opinion assumed that the appropriate standard to be applied was whether the joint sales agency
was "reasonable."106 Significantly, Hughes focused on the ecoa virtual impossibility. 441 U.S. at 20. The Court noted that "easy labels do not always
supply ready answers," id. at 8, and that "[l]iteralness is overly simplistic and often
overbroad." Id. at 9. Justice Stevens' dissent agreed that a per se analysis was inappropriate, but argued that the blanket license could be held unreasonable on the record
before the Court. Id. at 25-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On remand, the Second Circuit
upheld the blanket license under the rule of reason. 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar. 2, 1981) (No. 80-323).
104
288 U.S. 344 (1933).
••• Id. at 356-58. During World War I, coal production capacity was expanded to meet
a temporary increase in demand. After the War, there was surplus coal production and
excess capacity. Moreover, substitute energy forms, such as oil, natural gas, and electricity, were competing with coal and claiming a large share of the energy market. An additional factor that received little attention in the Court's opinion, but which probably
exacerbated the problem, was the general depression that began in 1929. As industrial
output declined, demand for raw materials, such as coal, necessarily declined as well.
106
As discussed at notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra, in 1911 the Supreme
Court held that only "unreasonable" restraints of trade violated § 1. However, in United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), the Court held that price-fixing
agreements are "in themselves unrell!l_9nable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity
of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed
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nomic distress of the coal industry in assessing reasonableness.107 He accepted defendants' claims concerning the depressed condition of the coal industry. 108 Hughes stressed "the
evils at which defendants' plan was aimed," asserting that the
joint sales agency was "an honest effort to remove abuses" and
would eventually promote the interests of commerce. 109
In restrospect, the Court's decision in Appalachian Coals
seems extraordinary. 110 The district court correctly found that
the joint sales agency necessarily eliminated competition among
the 137 participants and that the sales price of their coal was
stabilized. The fact that other coal companies competed with defendants should not have been significant. The Court has held
on several subsequent occasions that the presence of some competition is irrelevant if competition is restricted in part of the
market.m The desperate condition of the Appalachian coal in. . . . " Id. at 397.
107
Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
It is therefore necessary in this instance to consider the economic conditions
peculiar to the coal industry, the practices which have obtained, the nature of
defendants' plan of marketing sales, the reasons which led to its adoption, and
the probable consequences of carrying out that plan in relation to market prices
and other matters affecting the public interest in interstate commerce in bituminous coal.
Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 361.
108
Id. at 372. The district court's opinion also recognized the special problems facing
the coal industry, but, nonetheless concluded that the effect of defendants' practices was
to raise prices to a level higher than the competitive price. 1 F. Supp. 339 (D. W. Va.
1932), rev'd, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). The district court entered an order enjoining defendants from utilizing a joint sales agency. 1 F. Supp. at 347-49.
109
288 U.S. at 372. The district court had found that the joint sales agency necessarily
would eliminate competition among defendants themselves. 1 F. Supp. at 348. The Supreme Court, however, glossed over that finding; because defendants faced competition
from other producers, "the selling agency will not be able, we think, to fix the market
price of coal." 288 U.S. at 373.
The evidence leaves no doubt of the existence of the evils at which defendants'
plan was aimed. The industry was in distress. It suffered from overexpansion
and from a serious relative decline through the growing use of substitute fuels. It
was afflicted by injurious practices within itself - practices which demanded
correction. If evil conditions could not be entirely cured, they at least might be
alleviated. The unfortunate state of the industry would not justify any attempt
unduly to restrain competition or to monopolize, but the existing situation
prompted defendan°ts to make, and the statute did not preclude them from making, an honest effort to remove abuses, to make competition fairer, and thus to
promote the essential interests of commerce.
Id. at 372.
11
• In 1958, the Fourth Circuit examined a similar joint selling agency and found that,
notwithstanding Appalachian Coals, it constituted a per se violation of § 1. Virginia
Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958). The court indicated that Appalachian Coals "has not survived the strong and consistent course of subsequent decision." Id. at 540-51.
111
See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United
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dustry, and perhaps the nation's general depression, must have
influenced the Supreme Court's decision. Although Appalachian
Coals has little precedential value, 111 the case is of interest because it indicates the extent to which the courts may be willing
to allow depressed economic conditions to influence their decisions, even in the most egregious cases of price-fixing. As such, it
represents a high-water mark in the Court's consideration of economic distress in section 1 cases. Although the Court is unlikely
to take such an extreme position in a future horizontal restraint
case, Appalachian Coals still stands as precedent for renewed
consideration of this defense.
C.

Vertical Restraints: The Effect of Financial Difficulties

Non-price vertical restraints118 have had a somewhat tortuous
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 (1940).
11
• Six years before Appalachian Coals, the Supreme Court had held a price-fixing
agreement unreasonable without the necessity of a detailed inquiry into the reasonableness of the prices fixed. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397
(1927). The Court in Appalachian Coals simply ignored this precedent. Only seven years
later, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Court reviewed an arrangement which had the tendency to raise and stabilize the price of gasoline, but was claimed to be necessary to eliminate a "competitive evil." Justice Douglas'
opinion rejected defendants' arguments concerning "destructive competition" and their
attempted reliance on Appalachian Coals on the grounds that in that case the joint sales
agency did not involve price fixing and because of the plight of the coal industry. The
Court in Socony-Vacuum held that "a combination formed for the purpose and 'with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." Id. at 223.
Justice Douglas' initial basis for distinguishing Appalachian Coals seems inaccurate
because the joint selling agency fixed the price at which 137 producers sold coal. Apparently the second ground, i.e., the economic condition of the coal industry, was the real
distinction. The Court in Appalachian Coals used economic difficulties to justify the
--!lPPlication of the rule of reason rather than a per se test. In Socony-Vacuum, however,
the Court rejected similar arguments concerning financial difficulties. The Court inSocony- Vacuum thus limited Appalachian Coals to its facts. This failure to follow Appalachian Coals so soon after it was decided indicates that the Supreme Court's application in that case of the rule of reason to a price fixing conspiracy was an aberration.
11
• Generally, the rule of reason is applied to vertical arrangements, i.e., agreements
between a manufacturer and its distributors, suppliers and manufacturers, or wholesalers
and retailers, rather than to horizontal agreements between competitors. Thus, it is in
the area of vertical restraints that the courts have been able to consider such factors as
the economic condition of the entity imposing the restraint. The exception is resale price
maintenance, a vertical restraint which constitutes a per se violation of § 1. See, e.g.,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (dicta); Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220
U.S. 373 (1911). Indeed, the Department of Justice recently instituted the first criminal
felony prosecution of resale price maintenance. United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc., Crim.
No. H-80-49 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 17, 1980). On December 19, 1980, Cuisinarts entered a
nolo contendere plea and was fined $250,000. (1979-80 Transfer Binder] 4 TRADE REG.
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history in the courts. The Supreme Court's approach to such restraints _has come full-circle in less than fifteen years. P_rior to
1963, the Supreme Court had nev~r even considered a non-price
vertical restraint. Several major vertical restraint cases decided
thereafter present interesting implications for the failing company defense under section 1.
In the first litigated case involving non-price vertical restraints, White Motor Co. v. United States, 114 the Government
asked the Supreme Court to affirm a district court decision holding that a manufacturer's arrangement restricting the territory
of its dealers was per se illegal. 116 The defendant in White Motor
was not a failing company, but in dictum the Court analogized
to the "failing company doctrine" and noted that in such instances a merger that would otherwise offend the antitrust laws
may be given immunity, implying that business failure might
immunize an otherwise unlawful vertical restraint. 116
In the wake of White Motor, the FTC challenged vertical territorial restraints under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in Bandura Co. v. Federal Trade Commission. 117
Sandura was a small floor covering manufacturer that suffered
several product failures which nearly forced it into bankruptcy.
Its market share was declining in an industry dominated by
large firms, and it had difficulty attracting new distributors. The
FTC attacked Sandura's policy of assigning its distributors exclusive territories and requiring its distributors to sell only to
retailers. The FTC considered Sandura's marginal position, but
concluded that because it was not a failing company, it could not
justify its use of vertical restraints. 118 The FTC found that forbidding distributors from selling in each other's territory reREP. (CCH) ,r 45,080. Certain commentators, however, have questioned the continuing
validity of the per se status of resale price maintenance. See, e.g., Posner, The Rule of
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 7-10 (1977); Note, Sylvania and Vertical Restraints on Distribution, 19 B.C.L.
REV. 751, 769-71 (1978). The commentators have suggested that resale price maintenanc,e
may promote interbrand competition by encouraging dealers to provide pre-sale services.
'" 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
110
The district court in White Motor had made such a finding. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.
Ohio 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); See also ABA ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, VERTICAL
RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND CoMPETmON 7-8 (Monograph No. 2 1977). Because
White Motor was the first vertical territorial restraint case to reach ·the Supreme Court,
it refused to apply a per se test. 372 U.S. at 261, 263.
11
• 372 U.S. at 263-64.
117
In re Sandura Co., 61 F.T.C. 756 (1962), rev'd, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). Section
5 provides in pertinent part "[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(l) (1976).
111
61 F.T.C. at 809-16.
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strained competition among them and held that the vertical territorial restraints imposed by Sandura was an "unfair method of
competition" under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 119
The Sixth Circuit reversed. 120 Making it clear that it was using
a rule of reason approach121 and relying on White Motor, 122 the
court held that Sandura's territorial restrictions were justified. 128
The court emphasized Sandura's faltering financial condition
ap.d marginal competitive status12• in holding that Sandura
would have been unable to market its products successfully in
the absence of its closed territories policy. 136 The result would
have been a decline in interbrand competition, because Sandura
would have ceased competition with other manufacturers. 128
Only four years after it declined to find that vertical territorial
restraints were per se unlawful in White Motor, the Supreme
Court adopted a per se rule for vertical territorial restraints in
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co. 127 In adopting a per se
110

Id. at 809.

'"° 339 F.2d at 858-59.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 853-54.
113
Id. at 857 .
... Id. at 851-53. The court agreed with the FI'C that Sandura was not a "failing company." Id. at 855-56.
m Id. at 857.
'"" Id. A similar conclusion was reached in Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FI'C, 321 F.2d 825
(7th Cir. 1963), which involved a small manufacturer in a highly competitive industry.
The court accepted Snap-On's claim that territorial restraints were necessary to limit
dealer turnover. Id. at 831-32.
m 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Schwinn had adopted its distribution plan, which assigned
dealers to specific territories and barred them from acting as wholesalers, when Schwinn
was the nation's largest bicycle manufacturer. Id. 368, 370-71. Justice Fortas noted that
Schwinn therefore did not fall within the failing company example used in White Motor.
Id. at 374. Although the opinion noted that the Court should focus on the competitive
effect of the restraint, id. at 374, 379-80, no detailed economic analysis was used. In fact,
Justice Stewart's opinion notes that the Court has adopted a per se rule without considering the "function, purpose or effect" of the restraint. 388 U.S. at 388 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stewart noted that the district court
had found that Schwinn's distribution restraints enhanced competition. Id. at 386. He
was particularly critical of the Court for adopting a per se rule only four years after
concluding in White Motor that it lacked sufficient experience with non-price vertical
restraints to use a per se test. Id. at 389. Instead, the Court assumed that such restraints
were anticompetitive when the manufacturer sold the product to a distributor: "Under
the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict
and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer
has parted with dominion over it." Id. at 379.
Although the Government had not argued for a per se rule, id. at 373, the Court nonetheless adopted one and declined to follow its earlier decision in White Motor that it did
not know enough about the competitive effect of vertical restraints to hold them unreasonable on their face. The Government had argued that vertical restrictions should be
111

10

•

WINTER

1981)

Failing Company Defense

255

rule, however, the Schwinn Court referred to the "failing company" example used in White Motor, and thereby preserved an
exception to its new per se test: vertical restrictions might be
justifiable if imposed by a manufacturer who would be unable to
compete without them. Several lower courts recognized the validity of the failing company justification in dicta. uis Even the
Department of Justice indicated that that Schwinn left some
room for special economic justifications of vertical restraints:
The law as it stands does not, it seems to us, bar all consideration of special economic justification for territorial
restraints. First of all, the cases establishing so-called per
se rules against exclusive territory agreements, Schwinn
·and Topco, appear to leave room for exceptions. The
Court in Schwinn mentioned "possible factors" which
might "shelter" vertical restraints from the per se rule.
The Court said that in the Schwinn Company's own context the territory and customer restrictions were "unreasonable without more" (emphasis added). What "more"
might suffice was not fully explained, but the Court did
note its White Motor Co. decision, in which the existence
of a failing company or a newcomer seeking to break into
a market were mentioned as possible justifications for
territorial agreements. 119
Nonetheless, no court actually relied on a manufacturer's faltering economic condition in upholding non-price vertical represumed illegal unless the manufacturer could justify the restraint. See Posner, The
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1977) (Professor Posner argued Schwinn for the United States).
,.. See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 945 (5th Cir. 1975);
Ammerman v. Bestline Products, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
Dissatisfaction with Schwinn led lower courts to develop several exceptions to the per
se rule, including: health and safety, e.g., Tripoli Co., Inc. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); exclusive distributorships imposed unilaterally, e.g., Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); or restrictions that were not enforced, e.g., Janel Sales Corp.
v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968). See
generally ABA ANTrrauBT LAW SECTION, VERTICAL REsTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND
COMPETITION 14-20 (Monograph No. 2 1977); Note, Exceptions to Schwinn's Per Se
Rule: Their Validity and Implications for the Future, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 643
(1974).
'" Proposed Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on Exclusive Territorial Franchises, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1975); accord,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Exclusive Territorial Franchise Act, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1974).
.
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straints until GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T. V., Jnc. 180
Sylvania, a subsidiary of General Telephone & Electric Co.,
manufactured televisions. The domestic television industry was
dominated by two giants, RCA and Zenith, and Sylvania found
itself unable to compete. In 1962, with a market share of approximately one or two percent, Sylvania instituted a selective distribution system designed to develop aggressive, effective dealers. 181 Continental, a former Sylvania dealer, alleged that
Sylvania's location restriction constituted a per se violation of
section l. 182 The trial court instructed the jury that it could not
consider the reasonableness of Sylvania's location clause. Relying on Schwinn, the court rejected a proposed Sylvania instruction that would have allowed a finding of a violation only if the
location clause unreasonably restrained competition. 133 The district judge also rejected a proposed Sylvania "failing company"
instruction to the effect that the location clause was reasonable
if it enabled Sylvania to remain in the industry or to compete
effectively. 134 Not surprisingly, the jury returned a verdict for
Continental. 136
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court
erred in rejecting Sylvania's proposed rule of reason instructions. 136 The court distinguished Schwinn based on the size and
uo 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
m 537 F.2d at 984. Sylvania dealers were authorized to sell Sylvania products only at
designated locations and were unable to move Sylvania merchandise to a new location
without prior approval. No dealer was given an exclusive territory, however, and no
dealer was able to veto the establishment of a new dealer in its market. Through the use
of this new distribution system, Sylvania's market share increased to approximately five
percent, making it the eighth largest domestic television manufacturer.
Continental T.V. was a successful Sylvania dealer in Northern California. When Sylvania franchised a new dealer near one of Continental's stores, Continental objected and
reduced its orders from Sylvania. In 1965, Continental opened a new store in Sacramento
and sought Sylvania's approval to sell there, but Sylvania denied the request. When
Continental ignored Sylvania's refusal and sold Sylvania merchandise in Sacramento,
Sylvania terminated Continental's franchise and Sylvania's finance company sued Continental for unrepaid loans. Continental counterclaimed alleging a violation of § 1.
13
• 537 F.2d at 985.
m Id. at 987. The trial court judge was Associate Justice Tom C. Clark (Ret.), sitting
by designation. Id. at 987 n.10. Justice Clark had dissented in White Motor and argued
for a per se rule invalidating all vertical restraints. White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253, 275-83 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
n• 537 F.2d at 987.
13
• Id. at 986.
136
Id. at 988. The Ninth.Circuit distinguished Schwinn on its facts because Schwinn's
territorial restrictions required dealers to sell only in their exclusive territories and pre•
vented dealers from competing for customers outside their territories. Sylvania dealers,
on the other hand, could advertise in any area and could sell to anyone as long as they
sold from an approved location. Id. at 989-90. Moreover, Sylvania had at least two dealers in every market. Id. at 990. In separate opinions, Judge Kilkenny and Judge Brown-
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effectiveness of the two manufacturers. 137 Schwinn was the largest domestic bicycle manufacturer, while Sylvania, at the time it
instituted the location clause, had less than a two percent market share. Sylvania's location clause enabled it to grow to a
respectable five percent market share, thereby permitting it to
remain in the market as a viable interbrand competitor, while
preserving some intrabrand competition. 138 Although the Ninth
Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether the proposed
"failing company" instruction should have been given, the language of the opinion indicates approval of the concept of such
an instruction:

[Schwinn] indicates that the [failing company] defense is
also available in cases wherein a vertical restraint is being
challenged. The Court in Schwinn clearly indicated its
intent that the failing company defense, once shown,
would then subject the case to the rule of reason and the
per se rule would not be applicable. 139
The Supreme Court's opinion in Sylvania focused principally
on two points: the importance of interbrand competition and the
need to overrule Schwinn. Justice Powell's opinion recognized
that Schwinn allowed an exception to the per se rule for failing
companies, 140 but held that "the advantages of vertical restricing disagreed with the majority's efforts to distinguish Schwinn. Id. at 1008-12
(Kilkenny, J., dissenting); id. at 1021-25 (Browning, J., dissenting).
117
Id. at 991.
,aa Id. at 991, 1000-2. The Ninth Circuit relied on Justice Brennan's concurrence in
White Motor in which he emphasized that some vertical restraints promote competition
by permitting products to be marketed effectively. Id. at 990-91, citing White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 269, 272 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). It also cited an
FTC report that stated "in Schwinn, the Court left enough leeway in its initial threshold
test of the overall reasonablene88 of vertical arrangements to enable a manufacturer to
justify such an arrangement by establishing that it could not have entered the market or
expanded its market share . . . . " 527 F.2d at 996-97, citing FTC, REPORT OF An Hoc
COMM. ON FRANCHISING 30 (1969).
••• 537 F.2d at 1004 n.41.
"° Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 353-54 n.22 (1977). The
Supeme Court chose to use Sylvania to reconsider Schwinn. Justice Powell noted that in
White Motor, decided only four years before Schwinn, the Court refused to adopt a per
se test. Id. at 47. Powell's opinion utilized the detailed economic analysis that Schwinn
had endorsed but not applied. See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486 (1974), and United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969), where the
Court also emphasized the importance of detailed economic analysis. While recognizing
that vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition, Jusiice Powell chose to emphasize the primary importance of interbrand competition and noted that vertical restraints
can promote efficiencies and &ggre88ive marketing. 433 U.S. at 54-55. The marketing efficiencies recognized by the Court included: inducing retailers to make the investments
necessary to permit manufacturers to enter new markets, encouraging retailers to pro-
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tions should not be limited to the categories of new entrants and
failing firms. Sylvania was faltering, if not failing, and w~ think
it would be unduly artificial to deny it the use of valuable competitive tools." 141 Thus, the Court acknowledged the special
problems of failing companies, but also concluded that many
companies, even those that are successful, may compete more
effectively by imposing vertical restraints. As a result, the Court
overruled Schwinn• and returned to a rule of reason analysis of
non-price vertical restraints. 141
The Court could have stressed the failing company aspect of
Sylvania to a greater degree. Justice White, in an opinion concurring in the judgment, argued that by relying on the language
in Schwinn concerning failing companies, the Court could have
upheld Sylvania's marketing restraints by "refusing to extend
Schwinn to a vertical restraint that is imposed by a 'faltering'
manufacturer with a 'precarious' position in a generic product
market dominated by another firm." 148 Sylvania's faltering condition had been part of the Ninth Circuit's basis for distinguishing Schwinn. The fact that the Court failed to adopt Justice
White's argument suggests that the Court was looking for an opportunity to overrule Schwinn. Justice Powell's majority opinion
cited the criticism of Schwinn by both lower courts and legal
scholars. 144 This criticism, together with the Court's new emphasis on the importance of economic analysis, may have led to the
decision to overrule rather than distinguish Schwinn.
Nonetheless, on remand, the district court relied principally
on Sylvania's faltering financial status at the time the restraint
was imposed in granting Sylvania's motion for summary judgment. H& The court stated that "prior to 1965, defendant was a
vide product service and repair facilities, encouraging retailer promotion, eliminating
"free-rider" distributors who provided no services to customers, limiting product liability
problems, and compliance with federal laws concerning product safety and warranties.
Id. at 54-55 & n.23.
1
° Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 58 n.29.
••• Id. at 57-59. The Court left open the possibility that certain vertical restraints
might be illegal per se provided that such a finding was "based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than - as in Schwinn - upon formalistic line drawing." Id. at 5859.
148
Justice White's concurring opinion agreed with the Ninth Circuit that Schwinn
could be distinguished on the grounds that Sylvania's location clause imposed fewer restrictions on retailers. 433 U.S. at 59-61 (White, J., concurring). He also agreed that Sylvania's status as a faltering competitor with a small market share brought it within the
exceptions to the per se rule for failing companies suggested in Schwinn. Id . .at 64-65.
144
433 U.S. at 47-48 and nn.13, 14.
... Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
appeal docketed, No. 79-4131 (9th Cir. 1978).
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'faltering, if not a failing,' firm in the television industry," and
that Continental had become an effective interbrand competitor148 by implementing vertical territorial restrictions. m Thus,
the failing company aspect of Sylvania did not go unnoticed. 148
The failing company defense in vertical restraint cases has
been considered elsewhere, as well. In Beltone Electronics
Corp., 149 an FTC administrative law judge rejected a hearing aid
. manufacturer's claim that its "faltering" company status justified its assignment of exclusive territories to its dealers, which
was found to limit both intrabrand and interbrand competition. 160 The administrative law judge discounted Beltone's showing that its sales and market share had declined and that it had
sustained operating losses in recent years, because, among other
factors, it remained the largest domestic hearing aid manufacturer.1151 He found that its sales decline and losses could be due
to non-competitive factors. m
Although no other recent cases consider the effect of a manufacturer's failing condition on a rule of reason analysis of vertical
restrictions, the Department of Justice's enforcement policy
takes a competitor's financial condition into consideration. Richard J. Favretto, Deputy Director of Operations of the Antitrust
Division, identified three factors that the Department will consider in deciding whether to challenge non-price vertical re,., Id. at 1052.
••• The conclusion that its restricted marketing program made Sylvania an effective
competitor may have been premature. GTE has announced its intention to sell its television business, including both Sylvania and Philco. Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1980, at 4, col. 2;
GTE's president commented, "we aren't viable in the marketplace as a competitor and
we're prepared to exit the business if this doesn't go through." Id.
148
Balancing the benefits to interbrand competition against the damage to intrabrand
competition presumably will be achieved through expert economic testimony and analysis of the special competitive problems of the industry in question.
149
Dkt. No. 8928 (F.T.C. filed June 27, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Beltone Initial Decision]. In an earlier decision based on Schwinn, Beltone's distribution system had been
held to violate § 5 of the FTC Act. Beltone Electronics Corp., Dkt. No. 8928 (F.T.C.
Initial Decision, filed Sept. 7, 1976), summarized in [1976-79 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 1J 21,198. After the Supreme Court overruled Schwinn in Sylvania, the
FTC remanded the case to the Administrative Law Judge for a thorough examination of
effects of Beltone's distribution plan on interbrand and intrabrand competition. 91
F.T.C. 84, 85 (1978). An appeal of the Administrative Law Judge's supplemented Initial
Decision is pending before the FTC.
0
'"
Beltone Initial Decision, supra note 149, at 23-28.
101
From 1972 to 1977, Beltone's market share fell from 21 % to 16%. Id. at 15. During
the last five years, domestic hearing aid sales, not including Beltone, declined 4.5%,
while Belton's sales declined 22%. Id. at 13. Beltone sustained operating losses for 197679. Id: The FTC staff claimed that because Beltone was closely-held, it had little pressure to show a profit, and that a large portion of its losses were attributable to excessive
officers' salaries. 99 FTC: Watch 1-3 (June 27, 1980).
10
• Beltone Initial Decision, supra note 149, at 26.
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straints: the market power of the company imposing the restraint, the extent to which the restraint impedes intrabrand
competition, and its justification in terms of enhanced interbrand competition. 1 &3 He also stated:
I think the Division is not likely to challenge non-price
vertical restraints being used by new entrants or by marginal competitors like Sylvania who may be akin to the
failing company found in merger law. It seems to be generally accepted among many economists and businessmen
that vertical restraints can facilitate entry and continued
market presence of small manufacturers by permitting
them to secure the services of capable dealers and to
build a favorable image. This promotes interbrand competition while imposing limitations on intrabrand competition that are not particularly significant. m

D.

Applying the Failing Company Doctrine in Section 1
Actions: Problem Areas

For purposes of section 1, financial difficulties will be relevant
principally as an element to be considered in applying the rule
of reason in contrast with the use of the failing company doctrine as an affirmative defense in merger litigation. It seems unlikely that a company can successfully use financial difficulties
to justify a per se violation. 11111
The failing company doctrine as applied in section 1 cases,
however, does bear some resemblance to an affirmative defense,
raising questions as to allocating the burden of proof. Traditionally the plaintiff in an antitrust case bears the burden of proving
that certain conduct is unreasonable. The defendant (or respondent in an FTC case), however, presumably would raise the issue
of financial difficulties in the first instance in an attempt to rebut such a showing and to justify any restraint it had imposed.
Thus, in Sandura the respondent established that product fail103
Speech given by Richard J. Favretto on May 12, 1978, before the Southwestern
Legal Foundation Symposium on Antitrust Law in Dallas, Texas, reprinted in 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 50,370 at 55,801.
, .. Id. at 55,803.
10
• The Court hinted in Schwinn that the per se rule concerning vertical restraints
might be inapplicable to a failing company, thus raising the possibility that failing companies might raise the doctrine as a defense to a per se charge. It seems unlikely, however, that even business failures could justify price-fixing or a tying arrangement. See
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 216 (1940).
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ures threatened its competitive viability and that territorial restraints were necessary to build an effective distribution system.
Similarly, Sylvania established that it was a "faltering, if not a
failing, firm," 118 and that its use of vertical restraints permitted
it to become a real competitor in the television industry. 157 Information concerning financial difficulties or other business
problems is known principally by the defendant company. Presumably the courts will require the defendant to make whatever
showing is necessary to establish that its imposition of marketing restraints was reasonable. This approach seems more appropriate than requiring a plaintiff to establish that the defendant
is not a failing company as part of its· case.
The issue then becomes what the defendant company must
prove. In Sandura the respondent was a small competitor in a
field dominated by large companies. Its product failures nearly
forced it into bankruptcy before it began to market a new product successfully through the use of territorial restraints on distributors. The court found that Sandura's position was even
more precarious than that of a new entrant because it had to
overcome the reputation of its past product failures. 1118 Sylvania's competitive position was similar to Sandura's - a small
competitor (between one and two percent of the market) in an
industry dominated by a large competitor with a 60 percent
market sh,µ-e. 1119 Sylvania's market share was so small that it was
threatened with expulsion from t'1e television market. 180 Sylvania's limited distribution system enabled it to raise its market
share to five percent. 161
Under the failing company defense as applied in merger cases,
the defendant must prove that the acquired company faced the
imminent danger of business failure. 161 In Sandura and Sylvania a less rigorous standard was applied: the defendants were
faltering rather than failing. Thus, a defendant can justify certain non-price vertical restraints by establishing that it is a marginal competitor and need not prove that it actually is failing.
This standard seems appropriate because the principal concern
,.. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (N.D. Cal.
1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-4131 (9th Cir.).
••• GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
108
Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 851 (6th Cir. 1964).
••• GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
""' Id. at 983 n.2.
"' Id. at 984.
••• See notes 21-30 and 40-44 and accompanying text supra.
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under section 1 is interbrand competition. The continued viability or strengthening of a marginal competitor promotes interbrand competition and may reduce industry concentration, or at
least prevent increased concentration through the loss of a competitor. Thus, a company with a small share of a concentrated
market that is experiencing financial difficulties may be allowed
to impose restraints that would be unlawful if imposed by a
larger, financially-secure competitor.
The question arises whether a defendant would lose its
financial difficulties justification if, as a result of the restraint, it
became tremendously successful. It is unlikely that such a radical alteration in competitive strength could occur within even
the extended period of time required to try an antitrust case.
But assuming, however, that a defendant's competitive position
improved significantly, .the courts should not necessarily hold
any restraints it utilized to become a strong competitor to be
unreasonable. The restraint might nonetheless promote interbrand competition. Moreover, nothing in Sylvania suggests that
a firm with a significant market share cannot impose non-price
restraints, provided some legitimate justification exists. 168

E. Interpretation by Federal Enforcement Agencies
As discussed in Part IB above, the FTC and the Department
of Justice Antitrust Division have different interpretations of
the failing company defense in merger actions. 164 The testimony
given by the two federai enforcement agencies before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee highlighted those differences.1611 Although less evidence exists of the manner in which
the FTC and Justice Department will deal with a financiallyus Several commentators have suggested that market power may be a basis for finding
certain vertical restraints to be unlawful. See, e.g., Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints After Sylvania: A Postscript and Comment, 76 MICH. L. REV. 265, 272 (1977);
Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78
CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1978); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1977). In one
recent case, however, the court upheld territorial restraints imposed by a manufacturer
with a 70% market share without even discussing the problem of market power. Crowley
v. Braden Indus., (1980-1) TRADE CAs. 'II 63,134 (9th Cir. 1980).
In United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), af/'d
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567, the court permitted a new entrant to utilize an otherwise unlawful tying arrangement, but noted that if such restraints were continued beyond the
time reasonably necessary to protect the new entrant's business interests, they would
become illegal.
84
'
See notes 39-70 and accompanying text supra.
180
See id.
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troubled company that is charged with a violation of section 1,
some of the differences that characterized their approaches to
merger issues may be equally applicable under section 1.
The FTC generally construes the requirements of the failing
company defense in merger cases more strictly than does the
Antitrust Division. On the basis of the FTC's decisions in
Sandura 188 and Beltone, 187 it appears that the FTC is not receptive to claims of financial difficulties. In Sandura the FTC rejected Sandura's argument that its marketing restraints were
justified by its precarious financial condition. 188 Similarly, an
FTC administrative law judge discounted Beltone;s claim that
its recent marketing losses and declining sales justified the territorial restraints it imposed on dealers. 189 These decisions indicate that the FTC is generally skeptical about attempts to jus- .
tify marketing restraints on grounds of financial difficulties.
The only evidence to date of the Antitrust Division's position
on this question is the public statements made by Justice Department officials. In the wake of Schwinn, the Department rec-·
ognized that although territorial restraints were per se illegal,
Schwinn left "some room . . . for consideration of the economic
exigencies of particular situations."170 . In a speech given after
Sylvania overruled Schwinn, a spokesman for the Antitrust Division indicated that the Division is not likely to challenge vertical restraints imposed by marginal competitors "who may be
akin to the failing company found in merger law." 171 Thus, the
Antitrust Division's interpretation of the failing company doctrine for purposes of section 1, like its interpretation of the doctrine in merger cases, may be less strict than that of the FTC.
The Antitrust Division's views seem more consistent with both
the tone of the Supreme Court's decision in Sylvania and the
competitive realities that the Court indicated should be of primary importance under the rule of reason. The Supreme Court's
opinion in Sylvania shows a clear appreciation of the special
problems confronting a marginal company in a competitive industry. The Court recognized that vertical restraints may promote interbrand competition by allowing a marginal competitor
,.. Sandura Co., 61 F.T.C. 756 (1962), rev'd, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
Beltone Electronics Corp., Dkt. No. 8928 (F.T.C. filed June 27, 1980).
,.. Sandura Co., 61.F.T.C. 756, 809-16 (1962), rev'd, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
••• Beltone Initial Decision, supra note 149, at 23-28.
170
Hearings on Exclusive Territorial Franchise Act Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d
Cong., 2d SeSB. 18 (1974) (statement of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General).
171
See notes 153-54 and accompanying text supra.
187
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to attempt to develop an aggressive, effective distribution
system.
Thus the failing company presumably will find it much easier
to justify marketing restrictions than a successful competitor.
Failing companies lack the market power that could make vertical restraints imposed by dominant companies seem unreasonable. As in the case of Sylvania or Sandura, vertical restraints
may permit a manufacturer to remain in the market and perhaps to become a significant, viable competitor. When faced
with the alternative of some restriction on intrabrand competition or the reduction of interbrand competition through the loss
of a ~ompetitor, the courts should and probably will allow failing
companies to utilize vertical restraints, perhaps even in circumstances where a more successful competitor would not be allowed to do so.

CONCLUSION

The continuing controversy surrounding the application of the
failing company doctrine under section 7 of the Clayton Act, and
the revitalization of the rule of reason analysis under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, indicate that the financial condition of a company charged with violating the antitrust laws will remain a significant factor in judicial evaluation of such conduct. In fact,
there are indications that the courts today are especially conscious of the special problems facing a failing company. The
courts' sympathetic response to the plight of the failing company seems legitimate and appropriate, provided that the courts
remain aware that the primary concern of the antitrust laws
must remain the preservation of competition, not the implementation of social policy, a matter for Congress, not the courts. The
courts have recognized that i~ some instances permitting a failing company to engage in arguably unlawful conduct may promote rather than restrain competition. The majority of the cases
in which a company's financial condition has operated as an exception to the antitrust laws appear to have been decided correctly. In most such cases, the courts have focused first on the
competitive effect of the practice, and merely included the defendant's faltering financial condition as one element in that
analysis. Thus, assuming that they apply the proper standards,
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the courts can and should give consideration to the economic
condition of litigants in interpreting the antitrust laws.

